Papers, Please – Page 2 – Papers, Please!

Jun 12 2023

TSA misstates the case law on ID to fly

During an online panel last week hosted by the Cato Institute, TSA Privacy Officer Peter Pietra made some bold but false claims (starting at 18:05) about the case law on ID to fly:

Patrick Eddington, Cato Institute: I’m trying to understand if there is in fact a statutory basis for TSA to essentially say, “If you don’t show us an ID, you’re not getting on that airplane.”

Peter Pietra, TSA Privacy Officer: … I know that there was a case… where John Gilmore — Gilmore vs. Gonzales, I think was the case — did challenge ID requirements, and the 9th Circuit upheld them…. The one … case that I’m aware of being brought resulted in upholding TSA’s ability to require ID.

But as Mr. Pietra and the TSA should know, that’s not what was decided in Gilmore v. Gonzales.

Based on pleadings submitted to the court ex parte and under seal by the TSA, the 9th Circuit found that the TSA’s “identification policy” did not require passengers to show ID credentials in order to fly, but provided an alternative of a more intrusive search:

The identification policy requires airline passengers to present identification to airline personnel before boarding or be subjected to a search that is more exacting than the routine search that passengers who present identification encounter….

Gilmore had a meaningful choice. He could have presented identification, submitted to a search, or left the airport. That he chose the latter does not detract from the fact that he could have boarded the airplane had he chosen one of the other two options.

Neither Mr. Gilmore nor his lawyers saw or had any chance to rebut the claims made to the 9th Circuit judges by the TSA in its secret submissions. But the court’s description of the TSA’s identification policy as not requiring passengers to show ID, but allowing a more intrusive search as an alternative, was based entirely on the TSA’s own claims.

Having gotten the court to uphold its policy by representing that policy to the court as not requiring passengers to show ID, the TSA can’t now claim that the court’s decision “upheld” a policy requiring passengers to show ID — a policy the TSA specifically disclaimed in that litigation. The TSA told the 9th Circuit in its sealed, ex parte filings that pursuant to its policy Mr. Gilmore could have flown without ID if he had submitted to a more intrusive search, and the 9th Circuit decided the case on that basis.

Neither the 9th Circuit panel in Gilmore v. Gonzales, nor any other court, has reached the question of whether a requirement for airline passengers to show ID to fly has any statutory basis or would be Constitutional, much less upheld such a requirement

Mr. Pietra went on to suggest that, if the Constitutionality or statutory basis for requiring airline passengers to show ID were in question, the issue would have been litigated. But that ignores the fact that, when Mr. Gilmore tried to litigate exactly this issue, the TSA evaded the issue by denying to the court that it had a policy requiring ID to fly.

We continue to believe that both the TSA’s de facto efforts to require ID to fly, and any TSA policy to require ID to fly, lack a statutory basis and are unconstitutional. We hope that passage of the Freedom To Travel Act will clarify this issue and make it possible for those who are prevented from flying without ID to obtain redress through the courts.

Apr 03 2023

CBP wants more information to surveil and control air travelers

Today the Identity Project and allied civil liberties and human rights organizations submitted comments objecting to a proposal by US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to require all travelers on international flights to or from the US to provide an address in the US, two phone numbers, and an email address, and prohibit or recommend that airlines not permit anyone who is unable or unwilling to provide this information to board any flight to or from the US. (See our report when this proposal was announced.)

In return for collecting this information and passing it on to CBP, airlines would be allowed to retain and use it for their own purposes, without permission from travelers. Airlines would also be allowed (and in some cases required) to pass it on to foreign governments.

The proposed CBP rule would apply to all travelers, including US citizens (regardless of whether they reside in the US), visitors, and asylum seekers.

The proposed rule is far more significant and far worse than it appears at first glance.

Although the proposal is represented by CBP as a minor change to an existing program that would cost airlines nothing and impose no costs on travelers, it would cost the airline industry hundreds of millions of dollars and impose costs on would-be travelers, especially asylum seekers, that would be measured not only in dollars but also in lives. The proposed rule would also violate multiple provisions of the Privacy Act, including in ways that would force travelers to make personal information available to hostile foreign governments.

Below are excerpts from our objections to the CBP proposal. You can read the complete comments of the Identity Project and our allies here. You can submit your own comments until midnight EDT tonight, Monday, April 3, 2023, by filling out this form.

The undersigned civil liberties and human rights organizations – the Identity Project (IDP), Government Information Watch, Restore The Fourth (RT4), Privacy Times, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) – submit these comments in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, “Advance Passenger Information System: Electronic Validation of Travel Documents”, Docket Number USCBP-2023-0002, FR Doc. 2023–02139, RIN 1651-AB43, 88 Federal Register 7016-7033 (February 2, 2023).

By this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) proposes to (1) expand the fields of information that all international travelers flying to or from the U.S. by common carrier are required to provide to airlines and that airlines are required to pass on to CBP (while being free to retain copies for their own profitable use); and (2) prohibit airlines from allowing certain individuals including those who don’t have, or are unable or unwilling to provide, two phone numbers, an email address, and an address in the U.S. (even if they are U.S. citizens who reside abroad), to board flights, or recommend that airlines not board them (in violation of airlines’ duties as common carriers to transport all passengers paying the fares in their tariffs, and in violation of travelers’ rights under Federal statutes, the Bill of Rights, Executive Orders, and international human rights treaties to which the U.S. is a party).

The proposed rule is purportedly intended to “enable CBP to determine whether each passenger is traveling with valid authentic travel documents prior to the passenger boarding the aircraft.” Aside from the fact that CBP has no jurisdiction over foreign citizens boarding foreign-flagged aircraft at foreign airports, the proposed rule would have little or no effect on CBP’s ability to detect travelers using documents issued to other people. The proposed rule would not serve its stated purpose, but would only serve to expand CBP’s systematic warrantless, suspicionless, surveillance of air travelers and CBP’s attempt to control airline travel.

As discussed below, the proposed rule exceeds CBP’s authority and jurisdiction and is contrary to law. It is also bad policy. It amounts to an attempt to impose a travel document requirement in the guise of document “validation”, to outsource to airlines surveillance and control of travelers that CBP would have no authority to conduct itself, and to frustrate the human right to asylum by preventing asylum-seekers from reaching the U.S.

Feb 06 2023

CBP proposes to require even more information from international air travelers

US Customs and Border and Border Protection (CBP) has proposed new rules to expand its Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) to require all international airlines serving the US to provide additional information about all passengers, prior to flight departures.

CBP’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), published last Thursday in the Federal Register, falsely claims that the proposed rules would not affect individuals, only airlines. But the mandate for airlines to provide additional information about each would-be passenger makes it a de facto requirement, as a condition of air travel, for travelers to provide this information to airlines and the government.

This would constitute a significant expansion of an ongoing unconstitutional surveillance and profiling program in which all international air travelers are required to respond to suspicionless, warrantless, interrogatories administered through airlines as intermediaries and outsourced government surveillance agents and interrogators.

APIS is not a passive surveillance scheme, however. It is part of a real-time system of granular, per-passenger, per-flight government control of air travel:

After performing the security vetting, the CBP system transmits to the carrier an electronic message. This message is generally referred to as CBP’s response message. If the carrier is using an interactive transmission system, the response message provides certain instructions to the carrier. Specifically, it states whether each passenger is authorized to board, requires additional security screening, or is prohibited by TSA from boarding… Depending on the instructions received in the response message, the carrier may be required to take additional steps, including coordinating secondary security screening with TSA, before loading the baggage of or boarding the passenger at issue.

The Identity Project has objected to every step in the expansion of APIS since 2006, and we will be filing comments objecting to the latest NPRM. If you’d like to file your own objections, the deadline is April 3, 2023. We’ll post ours for others to use as a model.

Current mandatory APIS data fields include name, date of birth, gender, nationality, passport or travel document number, and flight details (airline, flight number, and departure and arrival airports, dates, and times). In addition to the information that CBP has been requiring since 2006, the new NPRM proposes that airlines operating flights to or from the US be required to collect and transmit to CBP additional information including:

Street address in the US (currently required of aliens but not of US citizens)
Telephone number and “alternate” telephone number (presumably the second phone number is required in order to help the government build social network maps and guilt-by-association links of First Amendment protected associations between individuals)
Email address

What if a US citizen has no fixed address, or no address in the US — or doesn’t want to tell the US government? What if they don’t yet know at which hotel or with which friend or relative they will be staying — or don’t want their host permanently linked with them in the government’s surveillance and suspicion-generating files?

Are two telephone numbers and an email address required as a condition of air travel?

The proposed rules are silent, but they imply that any airline that transports such a passenger would be subject to sanctions:

CBP cannot require that a passenger be denied boarding. However, if an air carrier boards a passenger who is then denied entry to the United States, the air carrier may have to pay a penalty and bear the costs of transporting that passenger out of the United States.

On arrival in the US, the US government has the duty to allow a US citizen to enter the country unless there is genuine doubt as to their US citizenship. They are not required to provide any information not related to, and needed to determine, their US citizenship.

If a CBP inspector at a border crossing or airport asks a US citizen their address in the US, phone number(s), or email address, they have the right to stand mute or to refuse to answer. CBP can search them, but cannot make them answer questions or deny them entry for standing mute.

If CBP would have no Constitutional authority to require a traveler to answer these questions after they arrive in the US, on what possible grounds would it claim authority to require answers to those same questions before a traveler even boards a flight to the US?

The NPRM does not mention the Bill of Rights or any limits on the authority of the government or a common carrier to demand personal information or answers to interrogatories as a condition of carriage. We believe that there is no such authority. The proposed rules would violate the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, the Privacy Act, and US obligations as a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) after September 11, 2001, the DHS has imposed more than a billion dollars in unfunded mandates to the airline industry to collect additional information about all airline passengers, transmit that information to DHS components (CBP for international flights and the TSA for domestic flights), and receive and process instructions from the DHS before issuing any boarding pass.

The proposed new rules would send the airline IT industry back to the drawing board to modify all of its software, user interfaces, APIs, and business-process layers to collect and transmit additional data fields about each passenger to CBP prior to departure of each international flight to or from the US.

CBP says that some airlines are already “voluntarily” providing personal information about passengers to CBP beyond what has been required by the current APIS regulations.

Why would airlines be willing to collaborate with the DHS in these schemes?

The proposed rules would leave airlines free to retain, use, share, sell, or otherwise monetize the additional personal information which travelers would be required to provide. This would amount to a huge informational windfall for airlines, and this is the quid pro quo to airlines for collecting this additional data for the government. To put it another way, the proposed rules would constitute a government-compelled taking and transfer to airlines of the value of travelers’ personal information.

Airlines don’t collect this data systemically now, and have not yet developed any standards for normalizing, storing, or exchanging it. This would be a massive unfunded mandate for modifications to airline industry IT systems, at every level from interline messaging protocols to user interfaces, and in training staff. But most of these costs would be one-time costs, and in the long term would be offset by the informational windfall to airlines.

Airlines are already experts in monetizing passenger data, making billions of dollars a year by selling advertising targeted to members of their frequent flyer programs. Compelled provision of additional contact information would enable airlines to expand these customer data monetization and ad targeting programs to all air travelers, including infrequent flyers who aren’t members of these programs.

Many foreign airlines are parastatal entities, so this rule would effectively require many asylum seekers to divulge info to the foreign governments from which they are trying to flee, prior to departure from those countries, placing themselves and their associates (linked to them by e.g. shared contact info) at even greater peril.

Travelers and airlines should just say no. Travelers should decline to answer questions unrelated to their admissibility to the US, and airlines should transport them anyway and challenge any attempt to impose sanctions on them for refusing to spy on their passengers by interrogating them and collecting surveillance data for the government.

Nov 23 2022

The airport of the future is the airport of today — and that’s not good.

(video; slides)

[Facial recognition at each step in airline passenger processing. Slide from presentation by Heathrow Airport Holdings Ltd. to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Traveler Identitification Program symposium, October 2018]

Today, the day before Thanksgiving, will probably be the busiest day for air travel in the USA since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020.

If you are flying this week for the first time in three years, what will you see that has changed?

Unfortunately, many of the most significant changes made during the pandemic are deliberately invisible — which is part of what makes them so evil.

During the pandemic, largely unnoticed, the dystopian surveillance-by design airport of the future that we’ve been worried and warning about for many years has become, in many places, the airport of today.

While travelers were sheltering in place during the COVID-19 pandemic, airports have taken advantage of the opportunity to move ahead with expansion and renovation projects. While passenger traffic was reduced, and terminals and other airport facilities were operating well below capacity, disruptions due to construction could be minimized.

A characteristic feature of almost all new or newly-renovated major airports in the U.S. and around the world is that they are designed and built on the assumption that all passengers’ movements within the airport will be tracked at all times, and that all phases of “passenger processing” will be carried out automatically using facial recognition, as shown in this video from a technology vendor, Airport of the Future:

[Stills from 2019 vendor video, Airport of the Future.]

In the airport of the future, or in a growing number of present-day airports, there’s no need for a government agency or airline that wants to use facial recognition to install cameras or data links for that purpose. As in the new International Arrivals Facility at Sea-Tac Airport, which opened this year, the cameras and connectivity are built into the facility as “common-use” public-private infrastructure shared by airlines, government agencies, and the operator of the airport — whether that’s a public agency (as with almost all U.S. airports) or a private company (as with many foreign airports).

Oct 04 2022

ICAO expands travel tracking and control through RFID passports

The triennial general assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is underway in Montreal for its first session since the outbreak of COVID-19, with speakers at its opening plenary last week including US Secretary of Transportation Pete Buttigieg.

It’s been many years since the US delegation to an ICAO meeting has included a Cabinet member. Secretary Buttigieg’s presence brought greater public attention than usual to the ICAO general assembly and related side events. Unfortunately, news reports have focused on what Secretary Buttigieg said (mainly his comments about Taiwan) rather than on what ICAO is actually doing.

Despite its ostensibly limited role as a specialized international organization with a mandate to administer aviation treaties — a role which would make it logical for the US delegation to be headed by the Secretary of Transportation — police in the US and other ICAO members have coopted ICAO into functioning as a policy laundering venue for imposition of surveillance mandates on all travelers, whether or not they travel by air.

Rather than “faciliating” travel, ICAO’s Facilitation Programme is increasingly devoted to facilitating government control of travel. This includes a new ICAO standard, as discussed below, to enable global blackballing of travelers disfavored by any ICAO member country.

So far as we can tell, no representative of a data protection authority or a ministry primarily responsible for protection of human rights or civil liberties has been included in any country’s ICAO delegation or appointed to any ICAO technical working group.

But that hasn’t stopped ICAO from issuing mandates, under the purported authority of aviation treaties but directly contrary to human rights treaties, for the creation of a new surveillance and pre-crime profiling agency in every ICAO member, and for deployment and use of passports containing remotely-readable RFID chips.

ICAO’s lack of expertise in this non-aviation policy area makes it exceptionally vulnerable to capture — and indeed it has been entirely captured — by a malign convergence of interest between proponents of government surveillance and control of travel and a travel industry which has been given a free ride for its shared use of government surveillance infrastructure and information for its own business process automation.

Here’s the bad news about what’s happening at ICAO with RFID passports:

Sep 22 2022

Freedom to travel to get an abortion

[Arrows indicate populations of states where abortion is, or is likely to become, illegal, and directions and distances to the nearest states where abortion is legal. Note that some of the routes shown are more likely to be followed than others, since abortion is more or less heavily restricted in some states where it is shown on this map as legal. Diagram by Bloomberg News based on data from the Guttmacher Institute.]

Increasing variations between state laws related to abortion are prompting an increase in the already large numbers of women who travel across state lines to obtain abortions.

For women in many states, bans on abortion are making the right to interstate travel an essential prerequisite to the right to obtain an abortion.

Both anti-abortion vigilantes and state laws criminalizing actions related to abortion, including facilitating abortion-related travel, are prompting women seeking abortions as well as those who support abortion rights to think about how to protect abortion travelers and their supporters against identification, surveillance, stalking, harassment, or legal sanctions.

In this context, the right to anonymous travel has acquired new importance and urgency. If you’ve wondered, “Why would anyone want to travel anonymously?” now you know one of the reasons. But what’s needed is “right to travel” legislation, not just “privacy” legislation. Current Federal “privacy” bills would do little to protect abortion travelers.

What are the patterns of abortion-related travel? How could state authorities or private vigilantes identify or track the travels of these women — whether they drive or take buses, trains, planes, or automobiles? What, if anything, can women traveling across state lines to obtain abortions do to protect themselves against being identified, tracked, and potentially prosecuted or subjected to retaliation, harassment, or other sanctions? What could the Federal government do to protect these women’s right to travel, and to do so privately and safely?

As discussed in detail below, the possibilities for technical self-defense against threats to the right to travel are limited. Congress needs to act to include protection for the right to travel — regardless of the purpose for which you travel — in any abortion rights legislation.

Sep 19 2022

CBP aggregates and disseminates travel data from warrantless searches

A series of revelations in recent months have highlighted a pattern of misuse by US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of data about travelers and their activities.

Information obtained without a warrant or probable cause under a under a variety of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment (including administrative searches and mug shots at airports, border searches, and “consent” to collection of location information by private third parties) has been aggregated, indexed, and made available for search and retrieval by other CBP staff, other law enforcement agencies, and foreign governments.

Use of the fruit of this surveillance of travelers hasn’t been limited to the government agency that first obtained it from travelers or commercial third parties, or to the purpose that purportedly allowed CBP to obtain it without warrant or probable cause. No access logs are maintained for some of these databases of travel surveillance data, so it’s impossible to audit how they have been used.

Here’s some of what CBP has been up to with its travel surveillance databases:

Sep 16 2022

Countdown to a crackdown on flying without ID

The Department of Homeland Security has added a Countdown to REAL ID Enforcement at airports to its website. But questions remain as to what this really means, despite our best efforts to find out.

What — if anything — will really change at Transportation Security Administration checkpoints when this countdown clock runs out on May 3, 2023?

Nothing in the law will change on that date. The REAL-ID Act of 2005 established criteria for which ID credentials can be “accepted” by Federal government agencies, in circumstances where individuals are required by Federal law or regulations to possess and/or show some evidence of their identity. But the consistent position of the DHS and TSA in litigation has been that no law or regulation requires air travelers to possess or show any ID. And the REAL-ID Act did not create any new requirement to have or show ID to fly.

Since the REAL-ID Act applies only to which IDs are accepted from those who choose to show ID to fly, it should have no effect, now or at at any date in the future, on those who don’t have, or choose not to show, ID to fly. They still have the right to fly without ID — as more than a hundred thousand people do every year — subject at most to a more intrusive administrative search of their person and baggage.

The “deadline” announced by the DHS and TSA might indicate plans for new regulations that would impose a requirement for air travelers to have or to show ID. But no such regulations have been proposed or included in DHS or TSA agendas of planned rulemaking.

Despite the lack of any apparent legal authority, however, it appears from the latest extrajudicial DHS and TSA rulemaking-by-press-release that these agencies plan to begin preventing anyone from flying without ID on or after May 3, 2023, on unknown grounds.

The following statement now appears on the DHS and TSA websites:

What happens if I show up without a valid driver’s license or state ID?

Starting May 3, 2023, every traveler will need to present a REAL ID-compliant license or an acceptable form of identification to fly within the U.S. Passengers who do not present an acceptable form of identification will not be permitted through the security checkpoint.

This would be a major change, with no legal basis, from current practice or any previously disclosed DHS or TSA plans.

Aug 22 2022

“Sobriety checks” of motorists as pretext for ID checks

In a disturbing decision, a 3-judge panel of the the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the arrest of a driver who who refused to show ID on demand of police at what was purportedly a “sobriety” checkpoint for motorists in Vallejo, California.

All charges against the driver, David P. Demarest, were dismissed before Mr. Demarest filed his Federal lawsuit against the police. The 9th Circuit opinion didn’t address whether any conviction would have withstood Constitutional scrutiny. But the 9th Circuit dismissed Mr. Demarest’s complaint against the police and the city of Vallejo for violating his civil rights by demanding that he show ID at a “sobriety” checkpoint without a warrant or probable cause to believe that he had committed any crime, and arresting him when he declined to show ID.

The tortured reasoning of the decision, Demarest v. City of Vallejo, No. 20-15872, decided August 16, 2022, hinges on the dubious and self-serving claim by the police that their “intent” wasn’t to use the “sobriety” checkpoint for general law enforcement purposes, that ID checks are an objectively permissible purpose for a checkpoint as long the subjective intent of the police wasn’t to operate a general law enforcement dragnet (as in fact it almost certainly was), and that the ID checks only minimally delayed most motorists beyond the delay that would have been occasioned by sobriety checks.

The decision notes that drivers were required only to show “facially valid” drivers licenses, which were not checked for outstanding wants or warrants.But that is treated only as evidence of whether or not the checkpoint was intended for general law enforcement purposes, and not as necessary dispositive of whether the ID demand was Constitutional:

The non-law-enforcement nature of the license checks in this case is especially clear, the City [of Vallejo] concededly did not use the license checks to conduct on-the-spot warrant checks. Cf. United States v. Bernacet, 724 F.3d 269, 271, 273–74 (2d Cir. 2013) (addressing a license checkpoint in which officers ran licenses through multiple databases, including a “criminal history database”). The mere request to produce a facially valid license is a relatively modest additional intrusion on the liberty of a motorist who has already been properly stopped at a checkpoint.

In the case cited in this portion of the 9th Circuit opinion, U.S. v. Bernacet, the 2nd Circuit upheld criminal history and warrant checks of drivers, using a system that queries multiple databases including the FBI’s error-ridden NCIC, at a warrantless, suspicionless motor vehicle checkpoint.

The effect of this decision is to invite police to demand ID at “sobriety” checkpoints.

For what it’s worth, the decision in Demarest v. Vallejo does not mention, and by its logic seems to leave intact, the 2019 decision of another 9th Circuit panel that passengers in motor vehicles, as distinct from drivers, cannot be required to show ID at checkpoints without individualized probable cause to believe that they have committed a crime.

[Update: “Demarest’s lawyer David M. Helbraun told the Vallejo Sun that he thought the court made a bad decision ‘because the city admitted it was not using the checkpoint to catch unlicensed drivers.’ Helbraun further said that then-Lt. Michael Nichelini said ‘under oath that the reason they were asking to see drivers licenses was to impress on drivers the authority of the police. That’s not a permissible purpose under the Fourth Amendment, and we are considering our options to appeal further,’ he added.” A “further appeal” would likely mean a petition for rehearing en banc by the 9th Circuit.]

May 20 2022

New reports on DHS surveillance and profiling

Two new reports from university think-tanks call attention to surveillance and profiling — including surveillance of, and action against, domestic and international travelers — by the Department of Homeland Security and its components.

A Course Correction for Homeland Security, a report by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University, cites to some of our work and some examples of cases we have been involved with in its analysis of DHS data collection (surveillance), and “risk assessments” (algorithmic profiling and control), especially as they relate to travelers.

American Dragnet: Data-Driven Deportation in the 21st Century, a report by the Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown University Law School, focuses on DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division, especially ICE access to facial images and other information obtained from drivers licenses and commercial data brokers.

A common theme of both reports is that DHS surveillance is more pervasive, more intrusive, and less visible than is generally recognized.

Airline reservations and demands for ID from travelers are used not merely to check for currently blacklisted would-be travelers, but are retained and used to build travel histories and social networks maps that are then used by suspicion-generating guilt-by-association algorithms to expand the web of surveillance, profiling, and extrajudicial blacklisting.

ICE represents itself as an agency with jurisdiction only over non-US citizens, but in fact runs photos and drivers license and location data about a large fraction of the entire population of US citizens through its profiling and enforcement algorithms. DHS lurks (usually invisibly) in the background, “ingesting” or obtaining access to personal information, when individuals pose for drivers license photos, make airline reservations, or interact with businesses that “share” data directly or indirectly with DHS.

What is to be done about this sorry state of affairs?

Both of these reports suggest that some reforms could be made by policy, at the direction of the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the heads of DHS components.

However, given the thoroughly bipartisan continuity of support by both Democratic and Republican administrations for the continual expansion of DHS surveillance, especially of travelers and foreigners and most especially of border crossers, since its creation 20 years ago, we have little hope for reform from within DHS or at the behest of the White House.

Exposure of abuses is good, but more is needed than a change of administration policy.

While we welcome any additional attention paid to the problems with the DHS, we think they call for court action to uphold the Constitutional and treaty rights of travelers and other individuals, and Congressional action to effectuate those rights and to facilitate judicial review and redress for government actions that violate those rights.

The DHS, as these reports reveal, is an ever-growing dragnet surveillance agency, operating outside the rule of law. What are we going to do to alter or to abolish it?